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Abstract
Background: In 2002, a voluntary diagnosis-related groups (DRGs) payment system was introduced in South Korea
for seven disease groups, and participation in the DRGs was mandated for all hospitals beginning in 2013. The
primary aim of this study was to compare results reflective of patient care between voluntary participation hospitals
(VPHs) and mandatory participation hospitals (MPHs) governed by either the DRGs or fee-for-service (FFS) payment
system.
Methods: We collected DRGs and FFS inpatient records (n=3,038,006) from the Health Insurance Review and
Assessment for the period of July 2011 to July 2014 and compared length-of-stay, total medical costs, shifting
services to an outpatient setting, and readmission rates according to payment system, time of DRGs
implementation, and hospital type. We analyzed the effects of mandatory introduction in DRGs payment system on
results for patient care and used generalized estimating equations with difference-in-difference methodology.
Results: Most notably, patients at MPHs had significantly shorter LOS and lower readmission rates than VPH
patients after mandatory introduction of the DRGs. Shifting services to an outpatient setting was similar between
the groups.
Conclusions: Our findings suggest that the DRGs payment policy in Korea has decreased LOS and readmission
rates. These findings support the continued implementation and enlargement of the DRGs payment system for
other diseases in South Korea, given its potential for curbing unnecessary resource usage encouraged by FFS. If the
Korean government deliberates on expansion of the DRGs to include other diseases with higher rates of
complications, policymakers need to monitor deterioration of health care quality caused by fixed pricing.
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Background
Diagnosis-related groups (DRGs) refer to groups of simi-
lar patients for consumption patterns of resources and
clinical characteristics. DRGs represent a flat per dis-
charge payment that differs based on severity, proce-
dures, and diagnosis [1]. The DRG payment system, as a
policy tool for efficiency improvement and cost contain-
ment, shifts economic responsibilities from insurers to
medical institutions and promotes consciousness for
costs among service providers. Thus, medical institu-
tions tend to regulate the payment mechanism by alter-
ing medical services [2]. DRG payment systems were
first developed at Yale University as an alternative to re-
imbursement payment system to manage medical ex-
penses. The US government decided to implement to
the Medicare program [3, 4]. Numerous Europe coun-
tries have also introduced the DRGs payment system to
manage medical expenditures and improve efficiency [5].
South Korea started to introduce national health insur-
ance in 1977 and adopted a fee-for service (FFS) system
for health care services [6]. FFS refers to a payment sys-
tem that healthcare provider is paid for each service
conducted, and research has indicated that FFS systems
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result in rapid increases in medical costs [7]. The Korean
government decided to introduce a DRGs payment sys-
tem to solve problems stemming from overtreatment
under the FFS system. The Korean government prelim-
inarily adopted a pilot program of the DRGs payment
system that reflected national average treatment charges
among patients in particular disease groups from 1997
to 2002. Following the pilot stage, Korea implemented a
voluntary DRGs payment system for groups of seven dis-
ease and gained participation from about 61% of all hos-
pitals nationwide [8]. As of 2012, the government
executed mandatory participation in the DRGs system,
beginning with relatively small medical institutions
(clinics or hospitals), followed by larger hospitals (gen-
eral hospitals or tertiary hospitals) in 2013 [9].
For South Korea, previous literatures have studied the
effect of implementation of the DRGs policy and have
often identified significant reductions in length-of-stay
(LOS) and out-of-pocket payments, compared to the FFS
system, despite some results to the contrary [10–15]. The
effect of the DRGs system for quality of care has also been
controversial [8, 16]. However, these inconsistencies may
be explained by the fact that many studies only examined
effects in voluntary participation hospitals (VPHs), which
likely manage more efficiently than other hospitals. Little
is known about the effect of the DRGs payment system
utilizing nationwide data from both voluntary and
mandatory participation hospitals (MPHs).
Therefore, we examined LOS, total medical cost, shift-
ing services to outpatient settings, and readmission rate
for patients from VPHs and MPHs governed by either
the DRGs or FFS. We also analyzed the effects of the
DRGs policy according to hospital type and date of
DRGs implementation.
Methods
Data sources and study design
The Health Insurance Review and Assessment (HIRA)
dataset includes information on the medical and phar-
macy bills for all Koreans. All hospitals or pharmacies
turn in claims dataset for outpatient and inpatient care,
including demographic information, procedures, diagno-
ses, and prescriptions, to the HIRA to get reimburse-
ment of medical expenses from the government. The
HIRA data were based on the sixth edition of the Korean
Classification of Disease, which is a revised version of
the tenth edition of the International Classification of
Diseases code [17].
From the database, we extracted inpatient DRGs data,
because DRGs only apply to admitted patients. We also
excluded records from inpatients who received medical
aid, as the DRGs system only includes recipients of na-
tional health insurance. We merged the DRGs data with
another hospital-based dataset related to patients treated
under the FFS system: the dataset was extracted by the
HIRA using unique patient IDs. We then collected all
information of inpatients from July 2011 to July 2014
with one of seven DRG-approved diseases (KDRGs
codes: C051, C052, C053, C054 [cataract surgery], D111
[tonsillectomy and adenoidectomy], G081, G082, G083,
G084 [appendectomy], G095, G096, G097, G098 [her-
niotomy], G102, G104, G015, G106 [hemorrhoidect-
omy], N041, N042, N045, N046, N047, N048
[hysterectomy], and O016, O017 [cesarean delivery and
hysterectomy and adneelomy]). In addition, we included
general information about the admitting hospital, such
as ownership, type, teaching status, location, and num-
bers of doctors, nurses, and beds, in our dataset. This
study received ethical approval for this research from
the institutional review board of the Yonsei University
Graduate School of Public Health.
Study sample
We included records of DRGs claim data and FFS
claim data and grouped them according to the date
DRGs was implemented. Hospitals were classified as
clinics; hospitals providing primary care, including in-
patient services; general hospitals; and tertiary hospi-
tals with more than 100 beds [18, 19]. In multivariate
analysis, we combined hospital types as large hospitals
(general hospitals + tertiary hospitals) and small hos-
pitals (clinics + hospitals).
Dependent variables
This study explored four items reflective of patient
care (LOS, total medical costs, shifting services to
outpatient settings, and readmission rates). These
items have often been utilized in studies of DRG ef-
fects in Korea [15, 20–23]. We assessed LOS using
admission date and discharge date. This research esti-
mated total medical costs as the sum of FFS or DRGs
claims for each inpatients, and we utilized each year’s
increasing rate of negotiated medical price to adjust
medical expenses to 2014 levels. Shifting services to
an outpatient setting was defined as visiting out-
patient institutions within 14 days before or after
hospitalization based on the admission date or dis-
charge date, respectively. We defined readmission rate
as readmission with same primary diagnosis within 30
days after discharge at the same or another hospital.
This study excluded results for cataract surgeries in
the readmission analysis because hospitals claimed the
same disease code when a doctor operated on the pa-
tient’s other eye before mandatory participation of the
DRGs system. This type of readmission differed from
our definition, which depended on the readmission
being clinically related to a prior admission [24].
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Independent variables
This study compared the results on patient care in
MPHs and VPHs. An MPH was defined as a hospital
that continued with the FFS system until July 2012
(clinics and hospitals) or July 2013 (general and tertiary
hospitals), whereas VPHs comprised hospitals that
implemented the DRGs system at least 6 months before
the mandatory participation of the DRGs system. Hospi-
tals that moved to DRGs payment within 6 months
before mandatory participation of the DRGs system were
excluded in this study. Thus, the experimental group
comprised patients who received care at MPHs, and the
comparison group included patients treated at VPHs
(Fig. 1).
Covariates
We matched patient level data to the hospital information
at which the patient had been admitted. Patient level data
included sex (female, male), age group (20-34, 35-49, 50-
64, 65-74, 75+ years), and Charlson comorbidity index
(CCI; 0, 1, 2, 3, 4+), which is constructed based on ICD-9
codes. The Charlson comorbidity index is the sum of
weighted scores allocated to main health conditions [25].
Hospital-level data included type (clinics, hospitals,
general hospital, and tertiary hospital), ownership (pri-
vate, public), teaching status (teaching, non-teaching),
sizes (number of beds), human resources (number of
doctors or nurses), and locations (urban or rural).
Statistical analysis
This study calculated summary statistics by calculat-
ing means and standard deviations for and frequen-
cies and percentages using chi-square test and t-test.
Chi-square tests of associations were utilized to assess
differences in proportions by mandatory participation
in the DRGs system.
This research used multivariate models to evaluate the
effect of mandatory participation in DRGs on LOS, total
medical cost, shifting services to outpatient settings, and
readmission. This study adjusted the models for princi-
pal diagnosis and patient- and characteristics in
hospital-level and then performed generalized estimating
equations (GEE). This study also utilized logit-link GEE
to assess shifting services to outpatient settings and 30-
day readmission and identity-link normal-distribution
GEE to evaluate log-transformed total medical cost and
LOS.
This study utilized a difference-in-differences method-
ology to compare pre- and post-reform changes between
MPHs and VPHs, in which we controlled for baseline
differences between the hospital groups. Previous studies
have used the difference-in-differences approach to esti-
mate the effect of policy alteration or introduction of
new system [26, 27]. The difference-in-differences meth-
odology is a standard policy assessment tool that
explores the independent effect of introduction of policy
on a case group in comparison with a control group
once any policy is implemented. The case group of this
study comprised patients admitted to hospitals that
mandatorily participated in the DRGs system, while the
control group consisted of those who admitted to hospi-
tals that voluntarily participated in the DRGs system.
Using data from patients before the mandatory imple-
mentation of DRGs, we were also able to control for
pre-reform trend differences to ensure that the esti-
mated impacts were not biased due to different baselines
for MPHs and VPHs. The DID estimator can be calcu-
lated only if in pre-treatment period parallel trend
assumption hold. We tested the parallel trend assump-
tion by hospital sizes (clinics and hospital; general and
tertiary hospital) and the parallel trend assumption was
satisfied (Additional file 1: Figure S1 and S2).
Fig. 1 Timeline for study subjects and study period
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Results
We collected records from 3,038,006 patients (DRGs
claim data: 2,565,902; FFS claim data: 472,104) and
grouped them according to date of DRGs policy imple-
mentation (pre- intervention: 1,011,057, July 2011 to
June 2012; first intervention: 1,014,627, July 2012 to June
2013; or second intervention: 1,012,322, July 2013 to
June 2014). We collected records for adults who were
discharged with a principal diagnosis for cataract sur-
gery, tonsillectomy and adenoidectomy, appendectomy,
herniotomy, hemorrhoidectomy, hysterectomy, or
cesarean delivery from one of 3,626 hospitals between
July 2011 and July 2014. Of these patients, 28.8% were
cared for by 1,432 MPHs, and 71.2% were cared for by
2,194 VPHs. The mean age of the patients at MPHs was
45.4 years, and 71.4% were women. Cesarean delivery
accounted for 25.7% of MPH cases, and approximately
half of the patients demonstrated a CCI of 0. The mean
age of VPH patients was 54.1 years, and 60.6% were
women. Cataract surgery accounted for 47.5% of these
cases, and 29.1% of the patients had a CCI of 0.
Table 1 shows summary statistics of patient and hos-
pital characteristics in this study. At the hospital level,
more than half of MPHs were clinics, and approximately
80% were private medical institutions that depended al-
most exclusively on payments for their revenue. Over
86% of MPHs served patients who lived in urban. The
average numbers of physicians, nurses, and beds were
29, 54, and 118, respectively. Approximately 85% of
VPHs were clinics, and 93.6% were private hospitals.
Over 90% served patients who lived in urban, and the
average numbers of VPH physicians, nurses, and beds
were 5, 9, and 30 respectively.
Table 2 shows that the average LOS of patients treated
at MPHs and VPHs reduced by 1.15 and 0.1 days, respect-
ively, with regard to the first intervention. At the second
intervention, LOS for MPH and VPH patients decreased
by 0.76 and 0.25 days, respectively. The average total med-
ical cost for MPH patients increased by $235, whereas that
for VPH patients decreased by $27 after the first interven-
tion. However, the total medical cost for VPH patients
increased by $41 at large hospitals at the second interven-
tion. Table 3 shows that the shifting of services to
outpatient settings among patients cared for at MPHs and
VPHs increased by 4.2 (p<.001) and 1.1 (p<.001) percent-
age points (p.p.) among small hospitals, respectively (first
intervention effect), while this increased by 2.1 (p<.001)
and 2.2 (p<.001) p.p. among large hospitals (second inter-
vention effect), respectively. Finally, readmission of MPH
and VPH patients decreased by 1.1 and 0.1 p.p. among
small hospitals (first intervention effect), respectively, and
readmission of MPH and VPH patients decreased by 1.2
and 0.3 p.p. among large hospitals (second intervention ef-
fect), respectively.
After adjusting for principal diagnosis, patient- and
hospital-characteristics, we discovered that the average
LOS of MPH patients reduced, compared to VPH
patients (adjusted odds ratio: 0.93, 0.89; 95% confidence
interval [CI], 0.92 to 0.94, 0.88 to 0.90) (Table 3). We
observed these LOS trends for all diagnoses except cata-
ract surgery (Additional file 2: Table S1). The total med-
ical expenses of MPH patients increased (adjusted odds
ratio: 1.38, 1.15; 95% CI: 1.37 to 1.39, 1.14 to 1.16)
except in cases of tonsillectomy and adenoidectomy and
hemorrhoidectomy (Additional file 2: Table S2). Table 3
shows that shifting services to outpatient settings for
MPH and VPH patients did not differ significantly (ad-
justed odds ratio: 0.99, 1.00; 95% CI: 0.96 to 1.01, 0.97 to
1.03), although we did observe some disease-specific var-
iations (Additional file 2: Table S3). Finally, this study
found that readmission rates of MPH patients reduced
(adjusted odds ratio: 0.40, 0.82; 95% CI: 0.36 to 0.45,
0.70 to 0.96); these trends were similar among all diag-
noses (Additional file 2: Table S4).
Discussion
In our broad observational study, we found that patients
treated at MPHs had significantly shorter LOSs and
lower readmission rates than VPH patients following
mandatory participation of the DRGs and that shifting
services to outpatient settings was similar between the
patient groups. In addition, the total medical costs in-
curred by MPH patients increased following mandatory
participation of the DRGs system.
First, we found that LOS among MPH patients was
significantly lower than that among VPH patients fol-
lowing mandatory participation of the DRGs system.
This result was similar to previous findings that indi-
cated the average LOS of patients with certain diag-
noses declined during the DRG pilot program (1997
to 2000) and implementation of the voluntary DRG
system (2004 to 2011) in South Korea [15, 28]. Re-
sults for other countries also indicated that a DRGs
payment shortened LOS [2, 29]. One of the major
purposes of DRGs systems is to reduce LOS, as well
as medical expenditures, for the patient. The average
LOS in Korea in 2013 was 16.5 days, indicating it the
second highest among the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development behind Japan (Japan:
17.2 days) [30]. The LOS in Korea is increasing annu-
ally, while that in Japan has reduced. It is interested
that LOS reduced significantly following DRGs imple-
mentation despite the surgical procedures utilized by
the Korean DRGs system are simple relatively. More
importantly, this significant reduction in LOS may be
a long-term effect of the system, as we observed re-
duced LOS during the second intervention period. In-
surers need to monitor treatment processes and
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Table 1 General characteristics of patients and hospitals in this study
Variables Total Patients in MPHs (N: 877,012) Patients in VPHs (N: 2,160,994) p-
value
N % N %
Patient characteristics
Age <.001
20-34 771,461 308,009 35.1 463,452 21.5
35-49 706,019 260,116 29.7 445,903 20.6
50-64 584,997 148,509 16.9 436,488 20.2
65-74 585,253 97,911 11.2 487,342 22.6
75- 390,276 62,467 7.1 327,809 15.2
Mean ± SD - yr 52.3±7.1 45.4 ±6.4 54.1 ±8.7 <.001
Sex <.001
Male 1,102,541 251,154 28.6 851,387 39.4
Female 1,935,465 625,858 71.4 1,309,607 60.6
Principal diagnosis <.001
Cataract surgery 1,191,471 164,350 18.7 1,027,121 47.5
Tonsillectomy & adenoidectomy 34,108 29,514 3.4 4,594 0.2
Appendectomy 189,782 153,249 17.5 36,533 1.7
Herniotomy 62,042 40,962 4.7 21,080 1.0
Hemorrhoidectomy 793,650 81,239 9.3 712,411 33.0
Hysterectomy 279,737 182,766 20.8 96,971 4.5
Cesarean delivery 487,216 224,932 25.7 262,284 12.1
Charlson comorbidity index (CCI) <.001
0 1,029,110 401,308 45.7 627,802 29.1
1 476,180 168,393 19.2 307,787 14.2
2 377,376 99,015 11.3 278,361 12.9
3 484,961 89,543 10.2 395,418 18.3
≥4 670,379 118,753 13.5 551,626 25.5
Hospital characteristics
Hospital type <.001
Tertiary hospital 44 44 3.1 0 0
General hospital 294 198 13.8 96 4.4
Hospital 582 346 24.2 236 10.8
Clinic 2,706 844 58.9 1,862 84.9
Hospital ownership <.001
Public 36 1 0.1 35 1.6
Corporation 405 299 20.9 106 4.8
Private 3,185 1,132 79.1 2,053 93.6
Teaching status <.001
Teaching 157 122 8.5 35 1.6
Non-teaching 3,469 1,310 91.5 2,159 98.4
Location <.001
Urban 3,216 1,237 86.4 1,979 90.2
Rural 410 195 13.6 215 9.8
Number of bed - mean ± SD 148±106 118 ±86 30 ±21
Number of doctor - mean ± SD 34±47 29 ±46 5 ±4
Number of nurse - mean ± SD 63±72 54 ±82 9 ±12
P-values were calculated with the use of Chi-square tests (or Student’s t-test) of association unless otherwise indicated
MPH mandatory participation hospital
VPH voluntary participation hospital
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results because the DRGs payment system may exped-
ite negative actions, such as inappropriate early dis-
charges of patients who had unstable conditions [31].
Second, total medical costs among MPH patients, but
not VPH patients, increased following mandatory par-
ticipation of the DRGs system, and the magnitude of
total medical costs reimbursed by the DRGs system is
greater than FFS system in Korea. These differences may
result in respective price adjustments for individual
diseases and insurance benefit approval for non-insured
diagnoses. The Korean Hospital Association has
contracted with insurers following the mandatory par-
ticipation of DRGs, and many medical departments have
complained strongly that such contracts were finalized
without their agreement. In addition, they resisted the
DRGs system until insurers reorganized the disease clas-
sification system and provided sufficient increases in re-
imbursements for patient care. As a result, insurers have
adjusted their payment rates to encourage medical com-
munity participation in and to minimize discontent with
the mandatory participation of the DRGs system during
the second intervention period. However, we suggest
that these price increases may be an inappropriate long-
term policy. The government should investigate the ori-
ginal prices for medical practice, materials for medical
treatment, and pharmaceuticals, and implement a
revised plan with reasonable indemnification. Also, the
proportion of un-insured patient costs that Korean hos-
pitals can coordinate arbitrarily, compared to the total
medical costs, is high. The large proportion causes a
relatively low public health care expenditure of 56% in
2013, which was lower compared to the OECD average
(72%) and is the fourth lowest of OECD countries fol-
lowing Mexico (51%), the United States (48%), and Chile
(46%) [32]. The government has converted some un-
insured expenses to insured costs, and insurers predict
decreasing out-of-pocket costs by about 20% with the
DRGs system. Therefore, potential increases in total
medical expenses will be affected by these conversions
of un-insured expenses. We suggest that the government
need to examine alternations for stabilizing the applica-
tion of un-insured costs by expanding the diseases and
diagnoses included in the DRGs system.
Third, because the DRGs system reimburses costs for
specific diseases based on a fixed price, physicians might
shift inpatients to an outpatient service to decrease med-
ical treatment or examination of inpatients. A prior re-
port reported that after participation of the DRG system,
the volume for pre-surgery examinations increased prior
to hospitalization [33]. However, this study found no evi-
dence that shifting services to outpatient settings in-
creased following mandatory participation of the DRGs
Table 2 Regression model estimates for length-of-stay and total medical cost by DRG policy intervention period
Variables Pre-Intervention First Intervention Second Intervention
7/2011-6/2012 7/2012-6/2013 7/2013~6/2014
Mean±SD Mean±SD B DID Mean±SD B DID
Length-of-stay
Large hospital
MPH 5.37±4.08 5.22±3.93 0.98*** 1.01 4.21±2.51 0.86*** 0.89***
VPH 5.71±3.27 5.52±2.73 0.97*** 5.27±2.45 0.97***
Small hospital
MPH 6.49±2.99 5.34±2.49 0.91*** 0.93*** 4.53±2.65 0.96*** 0.97***
VPH 2.55±2.18 2.45±2.06 0.98*** 2.35±2.00 0.99***
Total medical cost
Large hospital
MPH 1382±710 1353±705 0.98*** 0.87*** 1556±675 1.18*** 1.15***
VPH 1370±497 1549±568 1.20*** 1590±600 1.02***
Small hospital
MPH 1032±401 1267±440 1.33*** 1.38*** 1188±469 1.01*** 1.01***
VPH 836±216 809±301 0.95*** 802±309 1.00
MPH mandatory participation hospitals
VPH voluntary participation hospitals
DID difference-in-differences
Large hospital: tertiary hospitals + general hospitals; Small hospital: hospitals+ clinics.
Adjusted odds ratios obtained from generalized estimating equations analysis with all of the variables in Table 1.
All costs were controlled by medical insurance fees, which are annually adjusted and include un-insured costs.
1 USD = 1,200 Korean won (02/2016)
***p<0.001
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system. Although shifting services to outpatient settings
for MPH patients increased significantly, a similar ob-
served increase in VPH patients shifting services to
outpatient settings suggests that mandatory DRGs par-
ticipation is not the main cause of these transfers. A pre-
vious study that indicated the average number of
medical tests conducted prior to admission increased
from 3.51 to 4.46 following DRGs participation [28],
although we attribute this difference to study design.
Before controlling for other factors, we found that the
rate of shifting services to outpatient settings increased
by approximately 2-4 p.p. at MPHs, which corroborates
the above-mentioned study. However, we considered a
control group in our study design and believe this
approach resulted in a more robust analysis of DRGs
policy effects.
Finally, readmission rates, excluding those of patients
with cataract surgery, decreased significantly after
mandatory implementation of DRGs, indicating an over-
all improvement in the quality of patient care [34–44].
Our finding differed from previous research in which
hospitals discharging patients early had increased re-
admission rates [45]. This study implied that DRGs pay-
ment systems may decrease quality of care because of
“under-treatment” of specific conditions. But, there was
no evidence that readmission rates decreased following
mandatory participation of DRGs. These unexpected, yet
positive, results may be due to more accurate medical
coding, as insurers instruct all hospitals to submit separ-
ate DRGs claims, regardless of FFS claims already made.
Our findings related to reduced readmission rates during
the second intervention period supports this conclusion.
Future research is warranted explore readmission rates
of complicated procedures because the seven diseases
applied by DRGs systems are treated by relatively simple
surgical procedures.
This study has the a few limitations. First, our study
did not consider un-insured costs in the total medical
expenses. The Korean un-insured costs accounted for
24% of total medical expenditure in 2014. This research
also did not explore alterations in out-of-pocket costs in
the DRGs system because of our limited dataset. Second,
we controlled for hospital characteristics in our regres-
sion models, although additional differences between
MPHs and VPHs may have influenced our findings. For
example, VPHs may have elected to participate in the
DRG system because they already operated more effi-
ciently than other hospitals, which could impact results
on patient care independently of DRG implementation.
Third, because we examined seven diseases, these study
findings cannot be generalized to all diseases. Fourth,
because our research has utilized the administrative data,
Table 3 Regression model estimates for shifting services to outpatient settings and readmission by DRG policy intervention
Variables Pre-Intervention First Intervention Second Intervention
7/2011-6/2012 7/2012-6/2013 7/2013~6/2014
N (%) N (%) B DID N (%) B DID
Shifting services to
outpatient settings
Large hospital
MPH 55,388(31.12) 64,398(35.43) 1.25*** 0.94*** 68,360(37.50) 1.09*** 1.00
VPH 13,373(28.67) 14,111(33.84) 1.33*** 14,247(36.08) 1.10***
Small hospital
MPH 12,141(14.29) 20,047(18.46) 1.13*** 0.99 31,553(22.31) 1.08*** 1.02
VPH 339,579(48.32) 337,344(49.42) 1.05*** 321,412(49.61) 0.99*
Readmission
Large hospital
MPH 4,142(2.98) 4,022(2.85) 0.95* 1.14* 2,312(1.67) 0.59*** 0.82*
VPH 597(1.42) 433(1.16) 0.85* 300(0.85) 0.73***
Small hospital
MPH 1,576(1.86) 702(0.72) 0.38*** 0.40*** 735(0.66) 0.92 0.99
VPH 3,103(0.86) 2,829(0.82) 0.95 2,548(0.80) 0.96
MPH mandatory participation hospitals
VPH voluntary participation hospitals
DID difference-in-differences
Large hospital: tertiary hospitals + general hospitals; Small hospital: hospitals+ clinics.
Adjusted odds ratios obtained from generalized estimating equations analysis with all of the variables in Table 1.
Patients with cataract surgery as the primary diagnosis were excluded in total analysis.
*p<0.05 ***p<0.001
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our study might have overlooked any complications of
the patients. But, we utilized CCI scores of each patient
for evaluating the clinical characteristics of patients to
resolve this limitation partially. Finally, there is the pos-
sibility that patients were first treated in a hospital under
FFS and then in a hospital under the DRG system.
Conclusions
The mandatory participation of the DRGs system has
caused significant decreases in LOS and readmission rate
without increased shifting services to outpatient settings
for patients with one of seven DRG-related diagnoses.
Our findings support the continued implementation and
enlargement of the DRGs payment system for other dis-
eases in South Korea, given its potential for curbing un-
necessary resource usage encouraged by FFS. If the
government deliberates on expansion of the DRG system
to include other diseases with higher rates of complica-
tions, policymakers need to monitor deterioration of
health care quality caused by fixed pricing.
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